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PITFALLS IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ESTATES
EDWARD C. KING,
Dean, University of Colorado School of Law

The following is an address made at a meeting of
the Denver Bar Association on March 2, 1953.
I am going to talk about some problems which arise in the
administration of estates and trusts. Actually these problems constitute pitfalls, or traps, into which the unwary, inexperienced,
or ill-advised fiduciary* may fall.
I speak of pitfalls, but bear in mind that what may be a pitfall for the fiduciary may be a windfall for the beneficiary or for
a third person who has a claim against the estate. This being
true, some of you may be interested in these problems from the
fiduciary's point of view, some from the point of view of an attorney representing a beneficiary, and some from the point of
view of an attorney suing on behalf of a third person.
We are going to deal with problems affecting executors, administrators and trustees. Generally, however, when I speak of
one of these officers it includes, so far as liability is concerned, the
others. All are fiduciaries, all administer property for the benefit
of others, all act as principals not as agents, and all are held to
a high degree of responsibility. Certainly no one should accept
any of these offices, and no attorney should assume the responsibility of giving advice with respect thereto, unless he knows a
great deal about this subject. Most of the pitfalls, or traps, which
a trustee may encounter result from the numerous duties he owes
to the beneficiaries, and the fact that a violation of any of these
duties constitutes a breach of trust. There is, for example, the
duty of loyalty, the duty not to delegate authority, the duty to
exercise reasonable care and skill in the administration of the
trust, the duty to preserve the trust property, and the duty to
enforce claims. Additional dangers arise from the fact that trustees are often regarded as the owners of property, and also from
the fact that many people, including too many lawyers, think of
a trustee, or an executor, or an administrator, as an agent for
someone. They think of him as acting in a representative capacity
whereas he is not an agent. He acts as an individual and, as a
rule, his liabilities are the same as an individual acting for his
own benefit.
Here are some of the traps. To some of you they may be new;
to others they will only serve as reminders that danger exists.
The first of these traps or problems is based on the rule of
law that a trustee is personally liable to third persons for torts
EDITOR'S NOTE:

* The word "fiduciary" is here used generically to include executors, administrators and trustees.
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committed in the administration of the trust to the same extent
that he would be liable if he owned the property in his own right.
This is true whether the fiduciary committed the tort intentionally,
or negligently, or without fault, and whether or not he acted in
accordance with the terms of the instrument creating the relationship.
Here is an illustration. A owned a garage that was managed
by B. A died and his will authorized his executor, D (afterwards
defendants), to continue the garage business with said B as manager. The State law also authorized an executor to carry on a
decedent's business. During the administration of the estate P
(plaintiff) drove his car into the garage and as he did so the
sliding door came down and cut off the end of P's nose.
After the estate was closed, D the executor, discharged, and
the assets of the estate distributed to T, a trustee, P, the injured
person, brought suit for damages against D the former executor,
individually and as executor. He also joined T, the trustee to
whom the assets had been distributed.
T, the distributee, demurred. The demurrer was sustained.
D was left as the sole defendant. Then, despite the fact that D
had acted within his powers in continuing the operation of the
garage, that he was not personally at fault, and that he was no
longer executor, a verdict for $87,000.00 was rendered against
him personally and individually.
The case then went to the Supreme Court of California. There
it was held that the executor was personally liable for torts committed by the employees of the business operated by the executor,
even though the will and the State statute authorized him to continue the business. This was under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. The Court said that an estate is not a legal person or
entity and after distribution and discharge it no longer exists;
that an executor or trustee is not like an officer of a corporation,
free from liability if not at fault. It is the executor or trustee,
individually and personally, who acts or fails to act. The Court
added that usually there is a right of reimbursement; that is, that
this unfortunate D after being compelled to pay the $87,000.00,
might be able to get it back from T, who now had the trust assets,
but said the answer to that question depended upon whether or
not the executor was at fault, or whether the distributee had so
changed his position since distribution that it would be inequitable
to charge him. It was not decided in the California case that
D could recover from the trust estate. He was held liable individually for the $87,000.00.1
Here is trap number two. It is the duty of a fiduciary to
procure such insurance on the trust property as is customarily
taken out by prudent men with respect to their own property.
Refer again to the garage case. We found that the injured
person could recover $87,000.00 from D, the former executor,
' Johnston v. Long, 181 P (2d) 645 (1947).
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individually. We also found that D, if not at fault, might be able,
to obtain reimbursement from the assets which he had distributed
to T the testamentary trustee. But was D not at fault in failing
to take out liability insurance? It would appear-although this
is hypothetical, it is not in the decided case-that his failure to
take out adequate liability insurance to cover the garage constituted a breach of trust and that, therefore, he was at fault and
would not be able to recover from T, the trustee to whom the
estate was distributed.
One of the first duties of an attorney representing a fiduciary
should lie to advise the fiduciary of the importance of adequate insurance (liability and fire).
Trap number three is another dangerous situation. It is a
well established rule that a trustee is personally liable upon contracts made by him in the administration of the trust, unless the
contract expressly stipulates that he shall not be so liable.
Take the garage case again. This is hypothetical, but as I
have given the facts once I will use them to illustrate. Assume
the following facts:
(1) T, the distributee, is now acting as testamentary trustee
under the will.
(2) T was authorized to continue and did continue the operation of the garage.
(3) T decided to enlarge and build an addition to the garage.
(4) T made a contract which he signed, "T, as trustee under
the last will and testament of A, deceased", and by which
he agreed to pay the contractor $70,000.00 for the construction of the addition to the garage.
(5) While the addition was being built business turned bad,
the trust estate went into debt, and there were no longer
any substantial assets in the trust estate.
(6) The contractor presents his $70,000.00 bill to T, the
trustee.
T is liable individually, just as if he had contracted on his
own behalf. The fact that he signed the contract as trustee does
not free him from liability. He may, or may not, be able to reimburse himself from the trust estate.
That a trustee is personally liable on his contracts is well
established. It is so stated in Section 262 of the Restatement of
Trusts. He is personally liable for his contracts for all purchases
and services, including legal services. He is probably personally
liable on notes signed by him in behalf of the estate, even though
he borrows money with full authority.
The leading American case is Taylor v. Davis, as Administrator,2 and followed in scores of cases. In that case the Supreme
Court summed up the rule as follows:
2

110 U.

S.330

(1883).

DICTA

June, 1953

A trustee is not an agent. An agent represents and
acts for his principal. . . . When an agent contracts in
the name of his principal, the principal contracts and is
bound, but the agent is not. When a trustee contracts
as such, unless he is bound no one is bound, for he has
no principal. The trust estate cannot promise; the contract is therefore the personal undertaking of the trustee.
And the same is true of executors and administrators. Even
if an executor signs a contract pursuant to an order of court he
still is personally bound. He may or may not be able to obtain
exoneration from the estate. But any right to exoneration or
payment from the estate is derivative and arises only from the
relationship between the fiduciary who is personally liable, and
the assets of the trust estate.
For similar reasons title should never be taken in the name
of the estate of anybody. Corporate stock should never be registered in the name of an estate. An estate is not a legal entity.
Some of you may question some of these statements but I think
there is ample authority throughout the United States for all these
propositions.
There is, however, a conflict of authority as to the personal
liability of a trustee who signs a negotiable instrument in such a
way as to disclose the fact that he is trustee for a designated
estate, as for example, "John Doe, as trustee under the will of
Richard Roe, deceased." Section 20 of the Negotiable instruments
Law was intended to relieve trustees disclosing the trust from such
liability, but the wording is ambiguous.
Some of the courts interpret the Negotiable Instrument Act
as freeing him from personal liability. Others say that he is personally liable. So far as I know there has been no decision in
Colorado but it is well to assume that there is responsibility.
Now is there any way in which you can protect the trustee
against personal liability on contracts and notes? There is a way.
Put in your contract or on your note, "It is expressly stipulated
and agreed that the trustee shall not be personally liable upon
this undertaking and that the other contracting party shall look
solely to the assets of the trust estate which may from time to
time be in the hands of the trustee," or have him sign it as trustee and then add the words, "But not individually". At any rate,
use language clearly indicating that he is not binding himself individually but only as a fiduciary.
Trap number four is a particularly mean one. It is best illustrated by the leading Minnesota case of McLaughlin v. Minnesota
Loan and Trust Company.3 The facts were that Minnesota real
estate was leased for a 100 years, with covenants, running with
the land, calling for payment of rents, taxes, assessments, etc. In
1926 one Short owned the leasehold. After his death the leasehold
3255 N. W. 839 (1934).
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passed by will to the trust company as testamentary trustee, and
was accepted. It then turned out that the trust estate was insolvent and the reversioner (the owner of the land subject to the
lease) brought suit to enforce the covenants against the trust
company in its individual corporate capacity. It was held that
the trust company was liable, the court saying that at law a trustee is regarded as the owner with all the rights and subject to
all the liabilities of ownership. The trustee is liable or no one is
liable. The trust estate itself cannot be liable to suit, and is but
the fund out of which the trustee may reimburse himself for
proper expenditures.
An administrator, also, is the owner of the personal property
of his intestate and is subject to the liabilities incident to ownership. It makes no difference whether the property is a horse, a
watch, an automobile, or a dog, as was strikingly illustrated when
an administrator, who by virtue of his office became the owner of
for damages occasioned when the
intestate's dog, was held liable
4
dog bit a ten year old boy.
Trap number five may arise because of* situations created by
the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Here is what you might call the "discretionary authority
trap." There are a great many trusts in which the trustee is given
discretionary authority to use income, or income and principal,
for the support, maintenance, and education of children, or members of a family, of a person creating a trust.
Suppose I create an irevocable living trust with the X Bank.
I create it today. I have two children and I authorize the trustee
to use as much of the income or principal, or both, as the trustee
deems necessary for the education and support of my children
now living or hereafter born until the youngest reaches the age
of twenty-five and then to distribute the balance of the trust estate
to my Uncle Joe, we will say, or to the children.
The trustee, in the exercise of his discretion, uses the income
and principal for the benefit of my children, and finally exhausts
the estate. Then I die and then my creditors or Uncle Joe come in
and demand of the trustee the entire trust estate, including all of
the income earned during the administration of the trust.
It appears that the trustee would be liable for the entire principal and income. Why? Because the trust violated the Rule
against Perpetuities. The rule is that a discretionary power, such
as I have just mentioned, is void, as violating the Rule against
Perpetuities, if it can be exercised at a time beyond the period
of the rule. When I created the irrevocable living trust for my
children now living or hereafter born and permitted the discretionary power to continue until afterborn children, if any, reach
twenty-five, it violated the rule and was bad in its entirety.
In drafting wills for your clients, or in administering a trust,
look out for that discretionary authority, because in any case
'Adams v. Star, 49 A. 897 (1901).
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where it may be exercised in favor of persons not yet born it is
very likely that it violates the Rule against Perpetuities.
There are a number of other traps which are related to the
Rule against Perpetuities and arise from dangerous misconceptions. For instance, there is a common belief that if title is vested
in anyone, a trustee for example, the rule isn't violated. The
Colorado Supreme Court said so on one occasion. But that is not
true. It doesn't avoid the Rule against Perpetuities to have the
title vested in a trustee. The beneficial interests must vest within
the period or they are bad.
There is another belief that the Rule against Perpetuities has
to do only with restraints against alienation, and if there are existing persons who can convey absolute and indefeasible title the
rule is not violated. But that also is not true. For example, suppose that you convey Blackacre to John Doe and his heirs with a
proviso that if liquor is ever sold on the premises the property
shall go to Richard Roe and his heirs. Although John and Richard,
by joining in a conveyance, can give an absolute and indefeasible
title, the interest of Richard violates the Rule against Perpetuities
and John has a fee simple absolute. Richard's interest does not
vest until liquor is sold on the premises and this may not be until
a time later than lives in being plus twenty-one years.
In that general connection, but not with respect to estates, I
might mention another situation. A man sold real estate, and
reserved an option to repurchase the property at any time within
25 years upon the payment of $10,000. The option is void. It
violates the Rule against Perpetuities because it may be exercised
at a time beyond lives and twenty-one years.
Here is another dangerous situation. Ordinarily a trustee
may not deviate from the terms of the trust. That is, if a trust
instrument says that he shall retain the stock of American Telephone Company he has to retain it and if he sells is liable for a
loss. But suppose that X is administering a trust under the terms
of an agreement which provides that the trustee shall keep the
trust fund invested in good municipal bonds yielding not less than
4%, and suppose that no such bonds are available. There is another rule which says that the trustee is not under a duty to the
beneficiary to comply with the terms of the trust requiring him
to do something which is impossible. Here is the trap. Under
circumstances where it is impossible to comply with the terms of
the trust; for instance, where it is impossible to buy 4% municipals, the court will permit or direct the trustee to deviate from
the specific terms of the trust in order that the general purposes
of the trust may be carried out, and the trustee may be personally
liable if he neglects to apply to the court for permission to deviate.
It has been said that the invention and development of the
trust is the most important and distinctive achievement of Anglo-
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Saxon law. That statement might be questioned when we think
of such institutions as the jury, but the importance of the trust
in American life cannot be denied. Property of the value of sixty
billions or perhaps more is now held in trust. The administration
of trusts, and that includes decedent's estates, is as hazardous as
it is important, as I have attempted to demonstrate, and always
is accompanied by the element of contingent liability. Every lawyer who deals with trusts or trustees, executors, or administrators, should be aware of the dangers, and the collateral opportunities, which pertain to the law of trusts.

SUPREME COURT AMENDS RULES ON
ADMISSION
IN THE SUPREME COURT:
AMENDMENT TO RULE

202

Insert after paragraph B of Rule 202:
Provided, that if the jurisdiction from which an applicant in
Class A or B applies, imposes by any law, rule or regulation;
limitations, restrictions or conditions upon the admission of members of the bar of the State of Colorado seeking admission to the
bar of such jurisdiction, this Court may impose like restrictions,
limitations or conditions upon any such applicant seeking admission to the bar of this state.
Adopted by the Court en banc May 8, 1953.
AMENDMENT TO RULE

226

Rule 226 is amended to read as follows:
226. Any attorney and counselor at law in good standing
from any other jurisdiction in the United States, may in the discretion of any court of record in this state, be permitted to participate before such court in the trial or argument of any particular cause in which, for the time being, he is employed. Provided.
that a member in good standing of the bar of this court is associated
in such cause at all stages thereof.
Neither disbarred attorneys nor persons whose applications
for examination or admission have been rejected for failure to
show good character will be permitted to practice before any
justice of the peace of this state.
Adopted by the Court en banc May 14, 1953.
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CORPUS DELICTI
MAX D. MELVILLE,
of the Denver Bar

This is one of a series of memoranda on criminal law and
procedure prepared under the direction of Bert M. Keating, Denver District Attorney, for use by his staff and for distribution to
other Colorado District Attorneys.-Editor.
QUANTUM OF PROOF NECESSARY TO CORROBORATE A CONFESSION

This memorandum is concerned with the quantum and kind
of evidence necessary to corroborate a confession which is to be
used in proof of the corpus delicti. It is elementary that a confession, standing alone, is not adequate proof of corpus delicti;
but, contrary to the impression held by some, this does not mean
that a confession is not competent evidence that a crime has been
committed. The test is whether it is sufficiently corroborated by
other evidence so as to convince the jury that the crime charged
is real and not imaginary.
It was said in Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207, 214, 158 P.
2d 447:
Proof of the corpus delicti may be by circumstantial
evidence. Where defendant has confessed commission of
the crime, the confession may be considered in connection with other evidence to establish the corpus delicti
and it is sufficient if it is corroborated by other evidence.
* * * "While a voluntary confession is insufficient, standing alone, to prove that a crime has been committed, it
is, nevertheless, competent evidence of that fact, and may,
with slight corroborative circumstances, establish the
corpus delicti as well as the defendant's guilty participation. . . . The rule requiring corroboration of a
confession is met if the additional evidence is sufficient
to convince the jury that the crime charged is real and
not imaginary." Bunch v. People, 87 Colo. 84, 285 P.
766. See, also, Short v. People, 27 Colo. 175, 60 P. 350;
7 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) §§2070, 2071.
It should be remembered that the identity of the accused as
the criminal agent is not a part of the corpus delicti. This is
made clear in Ausmus and Moon v. People, 47 Colo. 167, 180, 107
P. 204, where it was said:
It, therefore, follows that under either the orthodox
rule as stated by Wigmore, or the broader sense in which
the words are used, the existence of the criminal factthe corpus delicti-in homicide may be completely established, before the question of the identity of the slayer
is reached. Treating the agency of the accused as one
element of the corpus delicti in its strict sense is certainly
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not in harmony with the proper use of that phrase. Ignorance of identity embarrasses the proof, and may cause
a fatal variance; but proof of the corpus delicti may yet
be complete, though ultimately the case fails for want of
proof, either as to identity of the slayer or the slain. Certainly in the sense of a completed case, in which sense
it is frequently used, it must include the identity of the
accused as the criminal agency, and the identity of the
deceased as the party alleged to have been murdered.
The same distinction between corpus delicti and identity was
made in Lowe v. People, 76 Colo. 603, 611, 234 P. 169:
Proof that one charged committed a felonious homicide involves three elements; first, the death. second, the
criminal agency of another as the cause; third, the identity of the accused as that other. The first two constitute what is known in law as the corpus delicti. Some
authorities erroneously include the third, but this makes
the corpus delicti identical with the whole case of the
people.
CORROBORATION OF CONFESSION MAY BE BY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

The rule in Colorado is that all of the elements of the corpus
delicti may be proved by circumstantial evidence. While such
evidence must establish the corpus delicti to a reasonable certainty,
and exclude every other possible hypothesis than that of guilt,
yet it is not necessary that each particular circumstance be thus
conclusively established. If the combined effect of all the circumstances produces the same degree of certainty as would be established by direct and positive proof, that is sufficient. These principles are set out in Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 207, 156 P.
2d 111, in this language:
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the corpus
delicti consists of two components: death as a result, and
the criminal agency of another as the means, and it is
equally settled that that the corpus delicti may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213, 17 P. 637; Ausmus and Moon
z,. People, 47 Colo. 167, 107 P. 204; Bunch v. People, 87
Colo. 84, 285 P. 766.
To convict one of crime, proof must be made that the
offense was committed and also that the accused was the
perpetrator or one of the perpetrators of the offense,
and both may be shown by circumstantial evidence. . .
The corpus delicti, and all the elements thereof, may
be proved by circumstantial evidence, from which the
jury may reasonably infer that a crime has been com-
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mitted. Such evidence must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis except guilt, and be convincing to a moral certainty; and such proof of corpus delicti must be the most
convincing and satisfactory proof compatible with the
nature of the case ...
A large number of the more modern cases, probably
constituting the weight of authority, however, have
adopted the rule that all of the elements of the corpus
delicti, including the fact of the death of the person alleged to have been murdered, as well as the criminal
agency of the accused, and the identity of the deceased,
may be proved by presumptive or circumstantial evidence,
at least when direct evidence is not available. And in case
of the entire destruction or disappearance of the body
of the person alleged to have been killed, as in the case
of drowning at sea, the corpus delicti may be proved circumstantially or inferentially.
It seems now pretty generally held that circumstantial evidence is admissible to establish the corpus delicti
in a trial for murder, but that it must be strong and
cogent..
In a case where circumstantial evidence is relied upon
to establish the corpus delicti, it is not sufficient that the
circumstances proved coincide with and account for, and
therefore render probable, the hypothesis of the guilt of
the accused. The evidence must be such as to establish
the corpus delicti to a reasonable certainty, and exclude
every other possible hypothesis except that of guilt; that
is, the evidence must be such as to establish so positively
the corpus delicti as to exclude from the minds of the jury
all uncertainty in regard to it. But to do this it is not
necessary that each particular circumstance be established thus exclusively. It is sufficient if the combined
effect of all the circumstances proved in a case is such as
to produce the same degree of certainty in regard to the
corpus delicti as would be established by direct and positive proof.
A CONFESSION Is "DIRECT"

EVIDENCE

Bruner v. People, supra, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P. 2d 111, deals
with a situation where all of the evidence going to show the corpus
delicti is "circumstantial." The subject dealt with in this memorandum, however, is concerned with the quantum and kind of
evidence necessary to corroborate a confession which is offered
in proof of the corpus delicti.
The confession itself is some evidence of the existence of
the "criminal fact"-the corpus delicti. All that is necessary, under the Colorado decisions, to make it adequate proof is that it
be corroborated by such circumstances as are "sufficient to con-
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vince the jury that the crime charged is real and not imaginary."
-Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207, 214, 158 P. 2d 447. And
the Williams case, it will be remembered, says that "slight corroborative circumstances" are sufficient.
Where a confession of the crime is proved, there exists a
great deal more than mere "circumstantial" evidence. The confession is "direct" evidence-sufficient, in fact, to permit infliction of the death penalty in a murder case where the only other
evidence is "circumstantial." Such was the ruling in Mitchell v.
People, 76 Colo. 346, 349, 232 P. 685, as to both written and oral
confessions. It was there said:
Here the question is this: Is a written confession,
a duly signed, attested, and proven document, circumstantial evidence? We know of no authority and can conceive
of no reasoning, which justifies an affirmative answer
thereto. Exhibit H was established beyond the peradventure of a doubt. Save for the contention that defendant
was intoxicated and was not warned, it is undisputed. By
this document, the person most concerned, he against
whose last earthly interest it stands, whose eye saw,
whose ear heard, whose hand acted, speaks. If this evidence is not direct, no evidence can be. The strenuous
argument that it is extrajudicial is beside the mark. The
question is not: Where was it given? but: How was it
given? Did it come from one whose senses took cognizance of the very facts in issue, or from one whose
senses only took cognizance of the facts from which those
in issue must be deduced? If from the former it is direct
evidence, if from the latter it is circumstantial. The conclusion is inevitable; this written confession was direct
evidence, and instruction No. 12 was correct.
ADOPTION OF THE COLORADO RULE

The rule as to proof of the corpus delicti by circumstantial
evidence was probably first announced in Colorado in Roberts V.
People, 11 Colo. 213, 216, 17 P. 637, involving the offense of larceny of ore from a certain mine. The evidence indicated that ore
had been stolen from the mine, and other evidence indicated that
the ore charged to have been stolen was in fact ore from the mine.
Defendant denied stealing the ore, although he did admit receiving certain ore from other persons. In holding that the evidence
was sufficient to support the conviction, the court said: •
The chief contention by counsel for the plaintiff in
error is that the evidence does not show the corpus delicti.
While direct evidence of the corpus delicti is always desirable, it should not be held indispensable. To so hold
would, in many cases, give immunity to crime, especially
in the class of cases to which this belongs. There is some
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conflict of authority, but we regard this as the better
doctrine. If, however, circumstantial evidence is relied
upon for this purpose, it should be such as to exclude all
reasonable doubt. I Bish. Crim. Proc., §1071, and cases
cited. In the case at bar we have to deal with the admission of the prisoner. The general rule is that the extrajudicial confessions of a prisoner are not sufficient to warrant a conviction without proof aliunde of the corpus
delicti; or, as it is sometimes stated, the prisoner's confession of the crime must be corroborated by other and
independent evidence. Id.; Whart. Crim. Ev. §632. We
are of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence to show
a larceny of ores from the Forest City mine.
CHARGE MUST BE "REAL,"

NOT "IMAGINARY"

It was stated, as has been seen, in Williams v. People, 114
Colo. 207, 214, 158 P. 2d 447, that the test is whether the evidence
corroboratory of a confession is sufficient to convince the jury
that the charged offense was real and not imaginary [ante, page
202]. The precedent cited was Bunch v. People, 87 Colo. 84, 86,
285 P. 766, where the charge was aggravated robbery. There,
the court said: " . . . we observe that proof of the corpus delicti may be made by circumstantial evidence. . . . And that
the rule requiring corroboration of a confession is met if the additional evidence is sufficient to convince the jury that the crime
charged is real and not imaginary. Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.),
vol. 4, §2071; Heard v. State, 59 Miss. 505; Sullivan v. State, 58
Neb. 796, 79 N. W. 721."
The court there cites with approval section 2071 of the second edition of Wigmore on Evidence. Wigmore, in his third edition (vol. 7, §2071), in which he places Colorado among the very
liberal jurisdictions in the matter of the proof of corpus delicti
(citing Bunch v. People, supra), had this to say: "In a few jurisdictions, the rule is properly not limited to evidence concerning
the 'corpus delicti'; i.e. the corroborating facts may be of any sort
whatever, provided only that they tend to produce a confidence
in the truth of the confession."
Another precedent cited in Bunch v. People, supra, to the
effect that all that is necessary is that the jury be convinced that
the crime is real and not imaginary, is Sullivan v. State, 58 Neb.
796, 79 N. W. 791, which contains an excellent discussion of the
problem:
The uniform doctrine of the American courts is that
a conviction for felony will not be sustained when the
only evidence of guilt is the extrajudicial confession of
the defendant that a crime has been committed. His
confession may be sufficient to prove his own connection
with the alleged criminal act, but there must in all cases
be proof aliunde of the essential facts constituting the
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crime. But, while a voluntary confession is insufficient,
standing alone, to prove that a crime has been committed,
it is, nevertheless, competent evidence of that fact, and
may, with slight corroborative circumstances, establish
the corpus delicti, as well as the defendant's guilty participation. Discussing this question, Nelson, C. J., in
People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 53, said: "Full proof of the
body of the crime, the corpus delicti, independently of
the confession, is not required by any of the cases; and
in many of them slight corroborating facts were held sufficient." The doctrine of this case was distinctly approved
in People v. Jaehne, 103 N. Y. 182, 8 N. E. 374, where it
was held that equivocal circumstances offered as part of
the corpus delicti might be interpreted in the light of
the prisoner's confession, and the fact under investigation thus be given a criminal aspect. In State v. Hall,
31 W. Va. 505, 7 S. E. 422, the court, considering this
question said: "We know of no decisions anywhere that
hold that the admissions of the defendant are not competent evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti, but
they certainly are competent evidence tending to prove
that the crime charged has been committed." It has often
been held in cases where there is no direct proof of the
crime, as in prosecutions for adultery and trials for homicide, where the body of the deceased has not been found,
that the defendant's extrajudicial confession, in connection with other incriminating circumstances, would warrant a conviction.
RULE NOT CONFINED TO HOMICIDE CASES

It is obvious that any test which can be applied to murder
cases would not be any more liberal in application where a lesser
offense is charged. No greater degree of proof is required. Thus,
in Woods v. People, 111 Colo. 448, 451, 142 P. 2d 386, the defendant was charged with larceny from the person, a felony. The
victim was unable to say there had ben any felonious taking of
his property; all he knew was that his wallet was missing in circumstances indicating that there had been a wrongful taking.
The victim's property was later found in the possession of the
accused. The court held that the corroboration requirement was
satisfied, saying:
We think the above resume of the facts as disclosed
by the record is ample proof of the corpus delicti. No
good purpose would be served by an academic discussion
as to what its component elements are. A comprehensive
review of the subject will be found in Ausmus and Moon
v. People, 47 Colo. 167, 107 P. 704. See, also, Lowe v.
People, 76 Colo. 603, 234 P. 169. While these are homicide
cases, the rule therein stated is made applicable to other
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crimes, e.g., in larceny, proof of "property missing" and
"somebody's criminality as the source of the loss." Ausmus and Moon v. People, supra. "The first two (elements
of homicide) constitute what is known in law as the corpus
delicti. . . . That proof may be made by any legal evidence, the same as proof of other facts." Lowe v. People, supra. "The corpus delicti in larceny is constituted
of two elements: (1) That the property was lost by the
owner; and (2) that it was lost by a felonious taking."
32 Am. Jur. 1033, §121. In this state the corpus delicti
may be proved by circumstantial evidence (Ausmus and
Moon v. People, supra; Bunch v. People, 87 Colo. 84, 285
P. 766), provided such circumstantial evidence is sufficiently clear to exclude any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Beeler v. People, 58 Colo. 451, 146 P. 762; Conferti v. People, 79 Colo. 666, 247 P. 1065; Allison v. People, 109 Colo. 295, 125 P. 2d 146. See, also, Cobianchi v.
People, 111 Colo. 298, 141 P. 2d 688. All of these requirements were fulfilled in the instant case, as appears from
the record, and a case of circumstantial evidence is presented which was properly submitted. . . . The evidence
excludes any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
EXAMPLES OF CORROBORATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Two Colorado cases appear to sustain the proposition that
a confession is sufficient to sustain the "fact of crime" if it is corroborated by circumstances.
In Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 207, 156 P. 2d 111, where
defendant was charged with the murder of his wife, the wife's
body was never discovered. Yet it was held that the corpus delicti
was established by the accused's admission that his wife had
died within his view (although he maintained that the death was
accidental). His admission together with a myriad of other circumstances, all viewed together as a whole, were implicatory.
In Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207, 158 P. 2d 442, where
the defendant was charged with infanticide, and where it was
necessary, of course, to prove that the infant had had a living,
breathing existence separate and apart from its mother, it was
held that the corpus delicti was established adequately although
the sole evidence that the infant had ever been living was that
its umbilical cord had been severed. This was sufficient when
taken with the accused's confession that she had drowned the
baby after she had delivered it.
It is quite evident that in Colorado the sole evidence necessary
to support a confession by the accused is such as will convince
the jury that the crime is "real," and not "imaginary." The confession is "direct" evidence, and the circumstantial evidence necessary to support that evidence in proof of the corpus delicti, as
evidenced by the Bruner and Williams cases, need only be "slight."
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ECONOMIC STATUS OF LAWYERS
JACOB V. SCHAETZEL,
of the Denver Bar

Many lawyers are now leaving the legal profession to enter
the more lucrative field of commerce. After years of study and
then entering into their profession the lawyers find that they were
unable to meet their accounts payable. Very few of these lawyers
realize what is happening to their profession and particularly
what is happening to themselves.
Lawyers who are employed on a salary basis by a governmental agency or commercial concern with the right to practice
in a limited way have a much larger net earning record than the
lawyer who is either employed by other attorneys on a straight
salary basis or who is an independent practicing attorney.
According to the last government survey of current business
issued July, 1952, and according to the previous reports, lawyers'
fees have gone up only 58% during the last ten years, while their
cost of living and operating their offices has risen 178%. This is
a record not to be compared with that of the doctors, dentists, and
engineers. The lawyers have the poorest record of all. All the
others seem to have met the problem and have answered it, if not
perfectly, at least much better than our profession.
The Economic Survey Committee of the Colorado Bar Association printed a report in Dicta, December, 1950, in which it was
stated that the median net income per lawyer in cities under
5,000 inhabitants for 1949 was $417.00 per month; in cities of
5,000 to 25,000 the average net income was $421.00 per month:
and in cities over 25,000 the net income was $501.00 per month.
The net income of all lawyers in Colorado during 1949 was $460.00
per month. Since that time living expenses and expenses of office
operations have advanced considerably but our fees again have
lagged. According to the government report the mean net income
of lawyers and dentists increased 10% during 1949 to 1951, while
the doctors' mean income increased by 13%, and in 1951 the income of doctors jumped a further 9%.
Since, 1929, those doctors in non-salaried practice increased
their mean net income by 157% as compared with 83% for nonsalaried dentists and 58% for non-salaried lawyers. During this
same period of time the average earnings of all non-farm workers
rose 144%.
All of the reports show a rather interesting side-light. Doctors engaged in groups up to 8 are able to earn about 21/, to 3
times what the individual practicing doctor earns. Lawyers in
partnership are also able to increase their earnings in proportion
to the number of partners. When doctors increase their partners
above 8 their incomes either remain stationary or decrease, whereas
lawyers' incomes increase in proportion to the number of lawyers
in the partnership.
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Law schools continue to turn out thousands of lawyers every
year and I feel that the answer is not less lawyers, but rather a
review of the fees charges and increases made where warranted.
What is even more important is to regain some of the law practice
lost to others and the more efficient handling of clients' legal work.
In my experience I have hardly found a client who is not willing
to pay a reasonable fee when the matter of the fee was discussed,
and the client understood the time that was involved, together with
the value of the work performed.
Our problem as attorneys is to answer to our own satisfaction a number of very pertinent questions such as:
If fees are increased to any great extent will the
clients find other means of having their legal work done
without the benefit of lawyers?
Can we make a better and more profitable use of our
time?
Can we bring more system into our offices in order
to save overhead expense?
would it not be advantageous to form legal partnerships, or at least associations with others to increase our
efficiency ?
Should we not stimulate more legal business through
bar association supervised advertising?
Why not make ourselves experts on income tax
matters ?
What other activities if any should we engage in
to supplement our ever-dwindling income, (such as real
estate, insurance, investment counselor service) ?
Whether or not increasing fees will hurt or help us depends
on whether the fee is reasonable, and also what competition must
be met from others, such as those who are unlawfully engaging
in the practice of law.
The American Bar Association in its Code of Ethics, Canon
Number 12, says:
In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which
overestimate their advice and services, as well as those
which undervalue them . . . in considerating the amount
of the fee, it is proper to consider (1) the time and labor
required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite properly to conduct the
cause; (2) whether the acceptance of employment in the
particular case will preclude the lawyer's appearance
for others in cases likely to arise out of the transaction
and in which there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be employed or will involve the loss of
other employment while employed in this particular case,
or antagonisms with other clients; (3) the customary
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charges of the bar for similar services; (4) the amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to
the client from the services; (5) the contingency or certainty of the compensation; (6) the character of the
employment whether casual or for an established and
constant client. No one of these considerations in itself
is controlling. These are mere guides in ascertaining the
real value of the services. In determining the customary
charges of the bar for similar services, it is proper for
the lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted
by a bar association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby, or to follow it as his sole
guide in determining the amount of this fee. In fixing
fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a
branch of the administration of justice and not a mere
money-getting trade.
For many years the writer has kept a record of the time consumed in the cases which he has handled. It has helped him in
getting the various elements together to fix a fee and to find out
how much time was consumed, not with the idea that we charge
for time, because that would not be correct, but time certainly
is an important element in arriving at the fee. All telephbne calls
and telephone messages to your home in the evenings should be
tabulated. It is surprising to find how many hours are consumed
in this way. Most lawyers do not consider this element in fixing
the fee. A frank discussion with the client before a case is accepted will eliminate a lot of friction at the end when everything
should be pleasant and harmonious, especially if the case was won.
We do not hesitate to use Mr. Reginald Heber Smith's formula
of allowing the client to fix the fee after we have told him what we
think a reasonable fee would be. We have not been imposed on,
with the exception of two clients. There seems to be no other way
to handle it to the satisfaction of the hesitant and shy client who
feels that to go into a lawyer's office is to take a leap into the dark.
The client is told that we will keep a careful record of the time
involved, and while this will not be the deciding factor, nevertheless when we are through with the case we will discuss the fee
with him. After recommending to him what we think we have
earned, we will permit him to fix the final fee. It works. The client
is put immediately at ease and he becomes a walking recommendation for you.
If the bar association has a schedule of minimum fees it is
so easy to refer to it and that ends the argument. If the client
feels that the bar association has adopted an official schedule it
must be all right and he cannot do anything further about it.
It behooves all lawyers to join their bar association, and for
the bar association to adopt a minimum fee schedule. The bar
associations should do much more in protecting the rights of their
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members and also see to it that those not entitled thereto, shall
not invade their profession. The bar associations should do this
not only for the protection of the lawyers but essentially for the
protection of the public. The bar associations are very lax in this
regard. The American Medical Association is very alert and we
hear very little, if any, unlawful practice of medicine. We used
to hear plenty of it. I don't believe I need enumerate where this
unlawful practice is coming from. In my opinion, every bar association should have a paid investigator and a paid prosecutor to
be the watchdogs of our profession. We could afford to double our
dues and still be ahead if we did this.
It has been estimated that at least 100,000,000 Americans
have never come to a lawyer with regard to a legal problem. The
field is immense. Every business man should have every contract
which he signs looked over by a lawyer in a constructive manner.
Trademarks should be protected. Estate planning should always
involve the service of a lawyer. Just look at the benefits the
public would receive from an education in what an abstract examination is. Each time a new ownership policy is issued on a title
it costs from $60.00 up, and every time the title changes costs
must be paid again. Look at the savings to the public in this one
item alone, and yet the title companies would have the public
believe that it is better protected under title insurance than by
an examination made by a competent attorney. If we must have
something like this why not a certificate of title under what is
commonly known as the Torrens Act? Practically every time the
legislature meets, a bill is introduced to abolish the Torrens Act
and yet it is the most efficient and cheapest method of handling a
title in the opinion of the author.
I would estimate that practically every attorney started his
practice by the examination of a title. I for one do not believe it
is advantageous to the community to abolish abstracts of title.
Let the young lawyer get his training in real estate titles in this
manner. Every title insurance policy is backed by the title examination of a lawyer and the public should know it.
We have often heard the expression that time is money, but
do we realize that fifteen minutes a day for one year for a person
earning $7,500.00 per annum is $234.00, and if you can save one
hour per day and put it into productive time on that basis you
would earn $936.00 more this year than you earned last.
I believe all of us could put in at least one additional hour
per day for 1953 if we half tried. More system in law offices will
produce more income with less work. Voice-writing machines produce remarkable savings for lawyers because while the lawyer
is dictating on his machine, his secretary is putting out the work.
At least two hours each day could be saved in this respect. The
trick would be to put these two hours into productive money producing services. It isn't must trouble to learn to dictate on one
of these machines. It does take concentration but, as with an
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electric shaver, one must patiently use it for a few weeks to
become accustomed to it.
Every judicial district should have a live, wide-awake, hardhitting legal aid society. It has been conclusively established that
one out of every hundred people needs the advice given by legal
aid once each year. They are not getting it at the present time.
The sooner the lawyers are alerted to this growing need, the better
the response will be.
The referral plan now adopted in Colorado is producing phenomenal results. People who never went to lawyers before are now
seeking their advice. Bar associations by group effort should
strike out in new paths to increase the usefulness of the lawyers
and make their services available to all the people instead of the
few now receiving it. The traditional independence of the lawyer.
or the dignity of the profession, is not impaired when careful
thought is given to the problem.
Every large business worthy of the name has a publicity
agent. Why shouldn't the lawyers advance their cause which has
such a glowing past and can have even a more useful and glorious
future? Why not put our best foot forward? Let the people know
what we can do and what we stand for and never let our profession
be slandered without a reply.
In August 1947 the American Judicature Magazine contained
an article on legal service offices and stated in substance that they
can become a great leader to the whole bar. From all the evidence
available this will be legal business from persons who in the past
did not have lawyers, often to their great loss, because of fear,
ignorance or because they were not law conscious.
Law offices should be open for the convenience of the clients
and the type of work done should govern as to the hours a law
office should be open. For example, for a young lawyer just starting I would recommend the opening of his office on Saturdays
and also some evenings each week. The challenge is to get the
most out of yourself and out of your office assistants.
Every hour must count. Learn to delegate as much of your
work to others as possible. It is not easy but it pays off well. By
having others do the detail work, the lawyer has more time to
concentrate on the more important work.
In our office we bill every month for work done during the
month. This is not 100'/ accurate but it is substantially correct.
We find the clients like to receive monthly statements. They are
used to sending checks by the 10th of the month and when we
finally complete a case, the fee isn't as large as it would have been
because most of it was paid during the time that the work was
going on. These bills go out as regularly on the first of the month
as the grocer sends out his statements. Why shouldn't we be paid
for the work as it is performed?
Legal work promptly done with a fee fairly charged will long
be remembered when the size of the fee is forgotten. Be meticu-
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lous in the way the office is conducted. All appointments should
be promptly kept by you and your clients. Well thoughtout filing
systems, well-paid secretaries, modern typewriters and voice-writing machines, careful bookkeeping, nice furniture, plenty of telephones, well-lighted offices, and a pleasant disposition on your
own part as well as on the part of your secretary-all of these,
and probably you can think of more, make up the sum total of a
successful practicing attorney who is in the upper income bracket.
In our office we have found that the return of files to a client
is a real benefit to him and to us.
In discussing this matter with various lawyers the comment
has been made that if you keep your client's file you can keep his
business. We have not found this to be true. We turned back files
for over 12 years. There is a constant turnover of clients. More
than most lawyers realize. It is necessary to continually fill in
for clients lost by death, retirement, removal, no-business and
dozens of other reasons. Actually in at least two instances we
found that the business came back to the office not because we had
the file but rather that the client had the file in his home. Relatives
from an eastern city coming to the funeral found our file and
brought the law business to us knowing that we had been the
attorneys.
Giving the file back to the client makes for better order in
the office. We try to keep our files active at all times and in that
way we do not have to waste time going through old files trying
to find the active material.
Lawyers are individualists but I do not think we should allow
our individualism to get the best of our judgment in handling
our offices. It is not easy to change to new and more modern
methods of business. We all know you can't teach an old dog new
tricks, but I believe that under the present economic pressure we
can do a great deal more than we are presently doing to increase
our incomes.
Lawyers generally are courageous. Their minds are trained
to look at the situation which they are facing with frankness and
candor. The old adage that "trifles make perfection, and perfection is no trifle", must be practiced.
It is the gathering together of all these "trifles" that I have
mentioned and putting them together that will make a more prosperous and better satisfied bar.
BOOK TRADERS CORNER
Former Assistant Attorney General James D. Parriott, Jr.,
is now an attorney for the Department of the Interior in Washington and offers for sale twenty-one sectional bookcases and an
assortment of law books including A. L. R. and digests, U. S. C. A.
and Colorado Session Laws. Persons interested should contact
Mrs. Parriott at 2536 Bellaire Street (FR 1043) in Denver.
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TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT CONFERENCE
The Annual Conference of the Tenth Judicial Circuit will be
held at the Stanley Hotel in Estes Park, Colorado, on July 16, 17
and 18, 1953. The Hon. Orie L. Phillips, presiding judge of the
Tenth Judicial Circuit, extends a cordial invitation to all members
of the Bar to attend. Reservations should be made directly with
the Stanley Hotel in Estes Park. The program for the conference
is as follows:
10:00 A.M.
10:30 A.M.

12:30 P.M.
2:00 P.M.

THURSDAY, JULY 16, 1953
Address of Welcome, JEAN S. BREITENSTEIN, President
of the Colorado Bar Association.
The Use and Misuse of Discovery Procedure.
Addresses: PHILIP S. VAN CISE, Esq., Denver, Colorado, member of the Colorado Bar.
PETER W. BILLINGS, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah,
member of the Utah Bar.
DENNIS MCCARTHY, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah,
member of the Utah Bar.
Discussion.
Recess.
Report of Special Committee on the Proposal for Legislation Giving the Right of Appeal from Interlocutory Judgments of the United States District
Courts:
HONORABLE ROYCE H. SAVAGE, United States District Judge, Northern District of Oklahoma,
Chairman.
Discussion: GEORGE SIEFKIN, Esq., Wichita, member
of the Kansas Bar.
RICHARD B. MCDERMOTT, Esq., Tulsa, Oklahoma,
member of the Oklahoma Bar.
General discussion.
Recess.

FRIDAY, JULY 17, 1953
10:00 A.M. Address, DR. ALBERT C. JACOBS, President, Trinity
College, Hartford, Connecticut.
10:45 A.M. Saving Your Client's Money by Abridgement of the
Record on Appeal.
Addresses: JOHN S. BOYDEN, Esq., Salt Lake City,
Utah, member of the Utah Bar.
GARRETT LOGAN, Esq., Tulsa, Oklahoma, member of
the Oklahoma Bar.
Discussion led by ROBERT B. CARTWRIGHT, Clerk, Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Recess.
12:30 P.M.
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2:00 P.M. Address, "Economical Administration of the Jury
System," HONORABLE WILL SHAFROTH, Chief,
Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics,
Administrative Office, of the United States Courts,
Washington, D. C.
Discussion.
2:45 P.M. Should Rule 37 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
be Amended to Obviate an Apparent Conflict with
Rule 33?
HONORABLE JOHN C. PICKETT, United States Circuit
Judge, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Discussion.
SATURDAY, JULY 18, 1953
10:00 A.M. Should a Statute be Enacted Giving to the United
States the Right of Appeal in Criminal Cases on
Questions of Law?
For: HONORABLE CHARLES S. VIGIL, United States
Attorney for the District of Colorado.
Against: HONORABLE J. J. HICKEY, former United
States Attorney for the District of Wyoming.
Discussion.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Report of Committee to Study Adoption of Court Rules
Regulating Accessibility of Lists in any Proceeding Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. MELLOTT, United States District Judge, District of Kansas, Chairman.
Consideration of resolution proposed by court reporters of the Tenth Circuit relative to salaries of
court reporters and transcript rates.
ENTERTAINMENT
THURSDAY EVENING, JULY 16, 1953
Chuck Wagon Dinner
Square Dancing
FRIDAY EVENING, JULY 17, 1953
7:00 P.M. Banquet
Speaker: The HONORABLE L. K. MUNRO, Ambassador
to the United States from New Zealand.
Other Recreation: Dinner dancing, golf, tennis, swimming, shuffleboard, square dancing.
Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield has approved a
commemorative postage stamp honoring the American Bar Association on the occasion of its seventy-fifth anniversary. The issue
is tentatively scheduled for release at Boston, Massachusetts, on
August 24, 1953, in conjunction with the seventy-fifth annual
convention of the Association.
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THE "TIDELANDS"

PROBLEM

EDWARD G. DUCKWORTH*

Few controversies have been so hotly contested as the matter
of the socalled tidelands. The stakes are high. The origin of the
claims of the federal government and of the states are obscure and
contradictory, presenting a complicated field for legal and political
analysis of problems which may be classified as legal-political and
to which legal theory alone cannot provide a satisfactory answer.
In order to understand the proper classification of the fundament and the terminology of the physical environment wherein
resources of oil, gas and sulphur are found under the sea water,
it is well to examine the physical terminology and description
first and then to superimpose on the physical description the legal
description of these submerged lands.
These disputed resources are found in the Continental Shelf
off the coasts of California, Texas and Louisiana. The continental
shelves are the margins of the continental masses. At a depth
of about 100 fathoms, the slope of the shelf which up to this
depth has been rather gentle, abruptly increases and plunges into
the deep sea basins. In the Gulf of Mexico, the Continental Shelf
extends in some areas 150 miles from the coast. Off the coast of
California, the Continental Shelf extends but a short distance
from the coast and it plunges rather abruptly into the deep sea
basins. The shelves vary in width, the edge being discerned approximately by the one hundred fathom measure of depth. Today
the ocean basins are slightly overfilled and are flooding these
shelves, these platforms of the continents. The area embraced
in these shelves is estimated to be one-tenth the size of the land
area of the continental United States, and this vast area contains
an estimated two and one-half billion barrels of oil yet to be discovered in addition to the 235,000,000 barrels of oil that have
already been recovered from lands beneath the seas. 1 Twenty-two
miles off the coast of Louisiana a well has been drilled and is
producing.
For purposes of this paper, lands below sea water are divided
into the following physical classifications.
1. Tidelands: the land between the mark of high tide and
low tide.
2. Continental Shelf: the land under the seas beyond low
tide mark to the edge of the Continental Shelf.
3. Deep Sea Basin lands: the lands beyond the edge of the
continental shelves, beyond the 600 fathom mark, and which extend under the oceans to the edge of the continental shelves of
the other continents.
Superimposed on this physical description, the following legal
* Student, University of Denver, College of Law.
Tidelands Bill Veto, U. S. Code Congressional Service, 1952, p. 2176.
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description is set forth for comparison.
1. Lands beneath the inland waters of the states. This classification includes the land beneath the sea waters of bays, harbors,
2
and sounds which have been declared to be inland waters.
2. Tidelands: the land between the mark of high tide and
low tide. Here the legal and physical description are the same.
These lands belong to the respective states that have sea coasts.
3. Lands below low tide mark seaward to a distance of three
miles from shore: These lands include part of the Continental
Shelf and may include land of part of the Deep Sea Basin. In
the Gulf of Mexico, the Continental Shelf extends out to 150 miles
from the coast. Off the coast of California, land three miles from
shore would be land in the Deep Sea Basin. Therefore, lands under
the sea extending three miles from shore off the California coast
would include lands of the Continental Shelf and of the Deep Sea
Basin.
4. Lands under the sea beyond the three mile belt to the
edge of the Continental Shelf.
5. Lands under the sea beyond the edge of the Continental
Shelf. These are the Deep Sea Basin lands which as yet are so
remote from human affairs as to be not in controversy. However,
if the Deep Sea Basin begins within the three mile limit, these
lands appertain to the bordering country.
To further complicate the physical, legal descriptions, land
in the legal sense is permanent. Land can always be found by
reference to mathematical surveys even though the character of
the land may have changed and be unrecognizable. If land is
flooded it can still be found; if the land has eroded away it can
still be found. Along the sea coasts, the physical permanence of
land is of a lesser degree than of the physical permanence elsewhere. The constant pounding of the seas has changed the character of the land in recorded history. The island of Helogoland
in 800 A.D. had a circumference of about 120 miles. The present
day circumference is less than three miles. The Yorkshire coast
since 1066 A.D. has receded in places more than a mile. Parts
of the New Jersey coast are receding at about five feet a year."
In addition to erosion, changes are caused by vast deposition of
delta materials, by the processes of accretion and reliction 4 and
by adjustments in land and sea levels. Along the coasts dynamic
physical forces are in play and are discernable by their effects
upon the fundament of coastal regions.
- Examples of which are Long Island Sound, Mobile Bay, Mississippi Sound,
San Francisco Bay, Puget Sound, Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay, New York
Harbor and Boston Harbor. Tidelands Bill Veto, supra.
I Geology for Engineers, Trefethen, Joseph M., D. Van Nostrand Company,
Inc., N. Y., 1949, p. 468.
Blackstone assigned to the King, as lord of the sea, the lands which it
leaves when it suddenly recedes. Blackstone's Com. 261.
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Admittedly the question of who "owned" the bed of the sea
only became of great potential importance at the beginning of
this century when oil was discovered there. 5 When oil began to
be produced in substantial quantities about twenty years ago, then
the question as to who owned these lands which formerly were
for practical purposes without value became an important question of first magnitude. The states are concerned with an interest
in royalties. The federal government is concerned not only with
royalties, but also it is concerned with the efficient development
and conversation of these reserves of oil and gas from the standpoint of national interest and security. Since oil was discovered
in these lands, great political, economic and social changes both
nationally and internationally have occurred, and since power
has more and more become centralized in the federal government,
as a natural consequence of these catalyzing forces, a more insistent demand that the lands beyond low tide mark belonged to
the federal government grew in some areasY No bill with such
a declaration was ever passed.
CULMINATION OF THE LEGAL CONTROVERSY

In 1945, the President issued a proclamation 7 declaring that
the natural resources of the subsoil and the sea bed of the Continental Shelf beneath the high seas appertain to the United States
and are subject to its jurisdiction and control. This proclamation
asserted the interests of the United States in the land and resources
under the sea well beyond the international three mile limit of
territorial waters. The Supreme Court has subsequently reinforced the national claims s by asserting that the right of the
United States and the duty imposed on the national government
by the federal system of government transcend those rights of a
mere property owner, and the property rights as to lands under
the marginal sea, are so subordinated as to follow sovereignty.
The Supreme Court held that the crucial issue was not merely
one of who owns the bare legal title to these lands. Rather the
issue was whether the capacities of the United States in the exercise of power and dominion to protect the people in their security,
and the national government's responsibilty for conducting relations with other nations, as an incident to the fact that the United
States is located adjacent to the ocean, were to be affected by
Bulletin No. 321, United States Geological Survey.
In 1937, Senator Nye introduced a bill for such a declaration. Gove'nment
and Business, Mund, Vernon A., Harper aid Brothers, Publishers, New York,
1950, p. 603.
U. S. Code Congressional Service, 1945, p. 1199. Executive order No. 9633,
U. S. Code Congressional Service, supra, p. 1315. reserved and placed the resources of the bed of the Continental Shelf under the control and jurisdiction
of the Secretary of the Interior.
United States v. State of California, 332 U. S. 19, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 91 L. Ed.
1889. Decided June 23, 1947. United States v. State of Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699,
70 S. Ct. 914. Decided June 5, 1950. United States v. State of Texas, 339 U. S.
707, 70 S. Ct. 918. Decided June 5, 1950.
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the claims of the states. The court held that the proper exercise
of these constiutional powers requires that the national government have power unencumbered by state commitments. The court
therefore did not determine the issue of ownership, but in a round
about fashion declared that the states' claim of ownership of the
traditional three mile limit was a claim not justified by law and
that the states could not interfere with the claims of the national
government in this area. The United States was granted injunctions against the states without a finding by the court that the
national government has a proprietary interest in the area.
Normally, an injunction against trespassers presupposes property
rights. The court adopted the theory that where low water mark
is passed international domain is reached and property rights
must be so subordinated to political rights as in substance to
coalesce and unite in the national sovereign. Legal opinion as it
is, this decision smacks of a political assertion; and in our system
of government political decisions are presumably for the Congress,
and not for the judiciary.
HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

Early writers thought with respect to property, that the sea
was not subject to the exclusive dominion of any nation, and could
not be apportioned by law.! As nationalism developed, as sea
power increased, ambitious men began to claim that the sea might
might be property, 10 and that such property was vested in the
Crown." The Englishmen of the sixteenth and early part of the
seventeenth centuries were zealous in claiming for their King the
dominion of the seas all around the British Isles. 12 The abstract
idea of dominion flows from the creation, in fact, of a strong navy,
a power which could enforce the claim of dominion. Without sea
power, claim of dominion of the sea is a nullity. Neighboring
nations were compelled to acknowledge the supremacy of English
Kings in order to have any use of the sea. As international law
developed, by general consent territorial waters have been regarded as capable of appropriation, and of being held by a kind
of possession. Upon the grounds of self protection and of mutual
advantage to maritime counties, such dominion has been acknowledged to carry with it the control of the contiguous seas, and the
exclusive right to enjoy whatever of value may be acquired therefrom. By the law of nations, the territorial waters extend only
to such distance as is capable of command from the shore, or the
'Vattel, See. 299, Grotius, Bk. 2, Sec. 3, 7, Cooper's Justinian 67, Sec. 1;
I Phil. Int. Law, Ch. 5.
'"Even Selden, who wrote his Mare Clausum (published 1635) to prove
that an exclusive right might be acquired in parts of the sea, admits that the
sea was originally common to all.
" According to Selden and his contemporaries, the King is lord of the great
waste, both land and water. Gould on Waters, p. 19.
"Selden claimed the seas which washed the shores of Great Britain and
Ireland were subject to the sovereignty of England even as far as the North Pole.
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presumed range of cannon, which for purposes of certainty is
regarded as one marine league." : The extravagant claims of England have been modified and now the Crown claims only to the
three mile limit which has generally been adopted by other nations.
The abstract idea of sovereignty was not perceived with sufficient clarity to enable those claiming that the seas were under
dominion of the English King, to claim the sea without basing
it upon title. The reasoning of zealots seems to have been that
since the title to the land covered by the sea was not in the subject, it must be in the King. As the title was placed in the King,
dispute arose as to whether the King held the lands beneath the
4
sea in his governmental right or in his private right.' The idea
of sovereignty rather than title seems to have been dominant. But
when the question arose as to the right between the King and his
subjects the idea of the King's sovereignty prevailed, and the
title was placed in him.
Prior to the decision in Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63,', the
open seas around the coasts of the British Isles were considered
to be the property of the Crown. It was said that the sea is not
only under the dominion of the King, but that it was his own
proper inheritance. According to Selden and the writers of his
time ", the King is lord of the great waste, both land and water.
As to lands between high and low water mark the dicta generally accepted has been that the Crown holds this property as
trustee for the public, and cannot since the Magna Carta 17 convey such lands to a subject. It has been broadly laid down that:
"The soil of the seashore to the extent of the three miles from
"Three and one-half land miles.
"See:
Gould on Waters, pp. 34-36.
'5Case

involved

charge of manslaughter against captain of the German

vessel, Franconia, which negligently ran against an English vessel at a dis-

tance less than three miles from the English coast, resulting in the deats

of

a passenger upon the English ship. Defendant was found to be not subject to

the jurisdiction of the English admiralty. The dissenting judges were of the
opinion that the territory of England and the jurisdiction of the Crown and
the Admiral included the waters within the three mile belt. Court declared
the territory of England extended only to low water mark. This case marks
the extreme point of retreat from Selden's theory. The decision evidently has
no effect on the Crown's claim to mineral resources. The Crown owned the
sea-bottom adjoining the coasts and that part of the seashore from low water
mark to the line of the neap tide. "Mines underneath the seashore belonged
prima facie to the littoral owner or to the Crown as the superjacent soil belonged to one or the other." Quotation from Lindley on Mines, who cites Mac
Swinney on Mines, pp. 30-31;
Mines, p. 178.

Bainbridge on Mines, 4th ed., p. 171: Rogers on

,"In so far as there was occasion to assert Selden's doctrine in treating of
the common law, it was accepted by Bacon, Coke, Hale and Staunford.
" The Great Charter of English liberties (but which was really a compact
between the king and his barons, and almost exclusively for the benefit of
the barons, though confirming the ancient liberties of Englishmen in some
few particulars) was wrung from King John by his barons assembled in Arms
June 19, 1215. Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
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the beach, is vested in the Crown". i s The claim of private title
of the King has given place to a representative title by which he,
holds for the people.
Sir Mathew Hale 19 wrote, in his De Juris Maris, 2 0 concerning the Crown's interests in navigable waters that this interest
is of a two fold nature. He defined these interests: a jus publicium
as a right of jurisdiction and control for the benefit of its subject
and a jus privatum as a right of private property which is subject
to the jus publicium, and which cannot be used by the Crown or
conveyed to a subject discharged of this public trust, or so as to
justify any interference with the public rights of navigation and
fishing. Under the fiction of the feudal laws by which all lands
were derived from the king as lord paramount, and held by his
bounty, the bed of tidewaters having no other acknowledged owner
are said to remain vested in the King in all cases where he has
not granted these lands away. So it came to pass that the Crown
owned the sea bottom adjoining the coasts of the British Isles and
that part of the seashore between high and low water mark.-'
In a dispute between the Queen and the Prince of Wales, as
Duke of Cornwall concerning mineral rights, arbitrators 22 decided
that all the mines and minerals lying under the seashore between
high and low tide marks, and under the estuaries, tidal rivers, and
other places beyond low water mark that were within the county
belonged to the Prince as part of the territorial possessions of
the Duke of Cornwall. The right to all mines and minerals beyond
low tide was vested in the Queen, although won by workings
commenced above low water mark and extended below low water
IsQuotation from opinion of Erle, C. J., from case of The Whitstable Free
Fisheries v. Gann, 11 H. L. Cas. 192, 20 C. B. N. S. 1, 35 L. J. C. P. N. S. 29,
12 L. J. N. S. 150, 13 Week. Rep. 509.
"Hale died in 1676. His treatise was not published until 1787. Gould on
Waters, p. 37.
Sergeant Merewether alleged that this document was not with good reason ascribed to Lord Hale, and the use of Hale's name had given undue weight

to the statements therein made. Merewether argues that Hale would have cited
the case of Johnson v. Barrett, Aleyn 10 (1646)

in which he was counsel if he

were the author of De Juris Mars, or that the case not being referred to, it
was decided against him. Rolle, the presiding justice, stated that if a wharf
were erected between the high and low water mark it belonged to the owner
of the adjoining land, while Hale, earnestly affirmed that it belonged to the
Crown of common right. It was agreed that if the wharf were erected beyond

the low water mark, it belonged to the King. Gould on Waters, p. 37.
1"The narrow sea adjoining the coast of England is part of the waste and
the demesnes and dominions of the King of England whether it lie in the body
of any county or not." Hale, De Juris Mais, Chap. 4.
"So, the King hath the propriety as well as the jurisdiction of the narrow
seas for he is in a capacity of acquiring the narrow and adjacent seas to his
dominion by a kind of possession that is not compatible to a subject, and accordingly regularly the King hath that propriety in the sea, but a subject hath
not, nor indeed cannot have, that property in the sea through a whole tract of

it that the King hath because without a regular power he cannot possibly possess it." Hale, De Juris Maris, Chap. 6.
-Arbitration is reviewed in Reg. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63.
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mark. The arbitrators recognized that there were places beyond
low water mark 23 which were within the county and belonged to
the Prince as part of his territorial possessions. The law of mining declares that one can follow the strike of a lode that apexes
within the claim to the end lines 24 and follow the dip extra-laterally beyond the side lines. Evidently low tide mark, in this case,
was taken as the limit of extra-lateral right by operation of the
law due to the ownership in the Crown, of the lands beyond.
The common law, so far as it is not repugnant to the institutions and laws of the particular state, has become, either by right
of discovery or by statute, the fundamental law throughout the
country except in Louisiana which follows the civil law. The
doctrine of jus privatum, was not fully recognized in England.
The American colonies were settled from England at the time the
doctrine was being established. The arguments of those of the
minority opinion appear to have had a significance in this country, unknown to the common law of England. Ancient usage of
most of the original thirteen states allow to the owner of the
adjoining lands rights in the lands and soil below the high water
mark of tidewater.2 5 The opinions and dicta of the English decisions were to the effect that the proposition had been generally
accepted that the Crown held this property subject to public usages.
The Crown appears never to have claimed any exclusive rights
in the tide water or in the land under them.
The argument of Sergeant Merewether, who challenged the
doctrine of jus privatum, had its effect in the American colonies,
and the law deviated from the common law of England. The King
had vast new dominions to dispose of in the fifteenth century.
The establishment of complete though subordinate sovereignties
had caused a different rule to be applied to the tidelands. This
difference naturally resulted where the intent of the grants of
the Crown was not merely to vest the Crown's right of property
in the grantees, but also to invest them with civil and political
powers.
The royal grant 26 of James I in 1620 to the Council of Ply23 It

is recognized, in the United States, that certain areas below low tide

are inland waters of the states, examples of which are sounds, inland bays, and
harbors. Tidelands Bill, Veto, supra. See: United States v. Mission Rock Co.,
189 U. S. 391, 23 S. Ct. 606, 47 L. Ed. 865.
24In mining law, the end lines of a claim, as platted or laid down on the

ground are those which mark its boundaries on the shorter dimension where
it crosses the vein, while the side lines are those which mark its longer dimension where it follows the course of the vein. But with reference to extra-lateral
rights, if the claim as a whole crosses the vein, instead of following its course,
the end lines will become side lines and vice versa. Consolidated Wyoming
Gold Min. Co. v. Champion Min. Co., C. C. Cal., 63 F.

Colonial Ordinance of 1647 (Mass.).

549.

See: Home for Aged Women v. Com.,

202 Mass. 422, 89 N. E. 124, 24 L. R. A. N. S. 79 (1909).
Oyster Bay, 209 N. Y. 1, 102 N. E. 585 (1913).

Tiffany v. Town of

" This grant was the basis on which most of the other grants were framed.
See: Lewis v. Utica, 145 N. Y. S. 346, 159 App. Div. 160 (1913) ; Towle v. Remson,

70 N. Y. Reports 303 (1877).
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mouth included in the grant the lands described and also "All
bays, ports, rivers, fishings, mines, etc., and all and singular other
commodities, jurisdictions, royalties, privileges, franchises, and
pre-eminances both within the tract of land upon the main, and
within the islands and seas adjoining". The words employed in
connection with the manifest purpose of the grant were held to
convey to the colonial governments the right and jurisdiction of
the Crown in the shores of navigable waters, and in the land beneath such waters, and to invest these newly created governments
with the powers of administration and legislation as were necessary to advance the well being and prosperity of the Colony.
English power and dominion was, at the times, also being extended to Asia. In a case involving the East India Company, the
Company, as representing the Indian government, was conceded to
have a27 freehold in the shores and bed of the navigable rivers of
India, and upon this same principle, the Colony of Massachusetts, in an ordinance passed in 1647, invested in the littoral proprietor the lands down to low tide mark or to a point not exceeding 100 rods from high tide mark. The people became sovereign
in 1776, and the respective states succeeded to the title of the
Crown in the tidewaters within their territorial limits, and to
such rights as had been previously granted to the local governments established under royal approbation. The general assembly of Massachusetts extended the territorial limits of the commonwealth one marine league from seashore at low water mark.2 s
The boundaries of counties bordering on the sea were extended
to the line of the State..2 " . The boundaries of the cities and towns
bordering upon the sea were co-extensive to the State line. 0 In
Pennsylvania and Virginia the division between private and public ownership was fixed at ordinary low water mark. 31 The California Constitution 3 and its Political Code 33 affirmed the state
line extending westward three miles from the shore.-' But as
states were by statute or constitution affirming that their jurisdiction extended to the three mile limit, concurrent federal jurisdiction had become implanted in the same areas. In 1794, Congress
recognized the three mile rule by authorizing the district courts
to take cognizance of complaints in cases of captures made within
the waters of the United States, or within a marine league of the
coasts or shores thereof. 1' , Justice Story held that as a principle
within the three mile belt form part of
of public law the waters
3
the nations' territory. 6
Doe v. East India Co., 10 Mo. P. C. 140.
St. 1859, Ch. 289; Gen. Sts. (1860) Ch. 1, Secs. 1, 2.
St. 1859, supra.
SSt. 1881, Ch. 196.
Black v. American International Corp., 264 Pa. 260, 107A. 737 (1919).
"Art. 21, Sec. 1.
Sec. 33.
"In
4
re Humboldt Lumber M. Ass'n, 60 Fed. Rep. 428 (1894).
Stats. at Large, Ch. 50, Sec. 6, 384.
Case of the Brig Ann, 1 Gall. 62, citing Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187,
234 (1812).
-7
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The Republic of Texas defined its borders claiming three
leagues from land from the mouth of the Sabine River to the
mouth of the Rio Grande River. After annexation, the State of
Texas reaffirmed this right of jurisdiction. The admission of this
claim by other nations was admitted to depend on the power of
the state to enforce it, but as between citizens of Texas the boundary was conclusive. 3 7 The treaty between the United States and
Mexico provided that the boundary line between the two countries should commence in the Gulf of Mexico three leagues from
land opposite the mouth of the Rio Grande River, and run northward with the middle of the river. '8
As there have been changes of sovereignty, such of the tidelands that were not previously granted passed to the new governments. In the original states and in Texas, the transfer from foreign government was direct so that there never was any title in
the federal government. In the other states the title passed to
the United States, and then to the state as they were from time
to time created. The United States maintained the policy of holding lands under these public waters for the ultimate benefit of
future states and accordingly refrained from making any disposal
of tidelands3 9 The states do not have absolute power to dispose
of these titles. Such right is limited by rights existing under the
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution and by the paramount
rights of the public to use the water for navigation or other public purpose. In some cases, state law or the state constitution
limits the right of the state to dispose of its tidelands. Subject
to these limitations, each state has the power to dispose of its
lands under public waters.
STATE CLAIMS

As to lands beyond high tide mark, the state bordering upon
the sea was the owner of all lands extending seaward to the limits
of its municipal dominions: these lands included those in landlocked bays and from the ordinary high tide on the shore of the
open oceans seaward to the three mile limit. 40 This rule applied
"7Galveston v. Menard, 23 Texas 349.
9 St. at Large 926, Sec. 5.
"With reference to the class of lands occupying this status, the Supreme
Court of the United States has expressed itself as follows:
"The United States, while they hold the country as a territory, having all
the powers both of national and municipal government, may grant for appropriate purpose titles and rights in the soil below high water mark of tide
waters. But they have never done so by general laws and unless in some case
of international duty or public exigency, have acted upon the policy, as most
in accordance with the interests of the people and with the object for which
the territories, were acquired of leaving the administration and disposition of
the sovereign rights in navigable waters and in the soil under them, to the
control of the state, respectively, when organized and admitted into the Union."
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 58, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1893).
San Francisco Savings Union v. R. G. R. Petroleum & M. Co., 144 Cal. 134, 103
Am. St. Rep. 72, 1 Ann. Case 184. 77 Pa. 823, 66 L. R. A. 242 (1904).
4'Lindley on Mines, Vol. 2, 3rd ed., p. 1015. The recent opinions of the
Supreme Court has nullified this statement as to the lands under the open
oceans seaward to the three mile limit.
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to islands off the coast which were within the control of the state.
When a new state was admitted to the Union, it became, by virtue
of its sovereignty, the owner of sea lands contiguous to it in the
same measure as the other states. The federal government held
tidelands of the territories for the benefit of such states as would
be ultimately carved out of them. 41 Such lands were not capable
of being acquired in private ownership under any of the general
laws providing for the disposal of public lands. 42 A mining claim
could not 43be so located as to extend below the line of ordinary
high tide.
In 1898, gold-bearing sands were discovered on the southern
shore of the Seward Peninsula, Alaska. Federal mining law had
been extended to this Territory, but the gold stands extended below
the line of ordinary high tide. No existing law permitted the
mining below high tide mark. 44 Permission was sought in some
cases from the Secretary of War, whose permission was necessary
as a prerequisite to the maintenance of structures in navigable
waters of the United States. Such licenses conferred no rights
except immunity from prosecution from carrying on mining operations in navigable waters. Due to geographic location, lack of
harbors, and lack of hazards to shipping entailed by the mining
operations permits were granted whenever applied for. Subsequently, Congress recognized these conditions. Provisions were
inserted in the Alaska Code governing the exploration and mining
of these beach deposits between low and ordinary high tide, on
the shore, bays, and inlets of the Bering Sea. Congress authorized
mining below the line of low tide under such regulations as might
be issued by the Secretary of War. Such beach claims could not
be patented. The code merely gave a privilege for exploration for
and mining of gold. When petroleum wells were drilled in the
ocean below the line of ordinary high tide off California, the Secretary of War granted the same class of permits as in the mining
areas on and off the coasts of Alaska. These permits were ineffec-

"'Note

that benefit is not necessarily equivalent to a
States may sell or otherwise dispose of tidelands bordering
ritory, subject to the jus publicium of the future state.
admitted, it acquires the control as sovereign over all its
prietor over all lands, not previously granted away. See:

trust. The United
the coast of a terWhen the state is
shores and is proShively v. Welch,

20 Fed. Rep. 28 (1884); Case v. Toftus, 39 Fed. Rep. 730 (1889). Pollard v.
Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), was concerned with disposition of certain lands

held by the United States under an express trust. The headnote states: "The
shores of navigable waters and the soils under them were not granted by the
constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states respectively;
and the new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over
this subject as the original states." The case is of no authority for the
proposition, that in absence of such an express trust, the government may not
dispose of tidelands in a territory merely because the territory may subsequently become a state.
11Not because of any express prohibition. The theory of holding for benefit
of future states was dominant.
11In re Logan, 29 L. D. 395.
41Miners are prone to make their own law where there is a vacuum.
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tual as conferring any rights against littoral owners. 45 The title,
in that day, was thought to be in the state. Legislation was passed
whereby lands between high and low water mark were withdrawn
from sale. 46 State legislation was then thought a requisite to
regulate all industrial activities in tidal waters and in lands out
to the marine league.47 The coastal states asserted and assumed
regulating control over the shell fisheries, sponges, and other kinds
of marine life within the three mile limit.48 Such regulation, once
thought to be as to property of the state, is now mere exercise of
the police power.
As more oil was discovered and produced, states were led to
reaffirm their ownership claims to lands out to three miles seaward from high tide mark and beyond. 49 The states desired to
reinforce claims which were already theirs. In 1938, Louisiana,
by statute affirmed ownership of land twenty-seven miles from
shore. In 1947, Texas extended its boundary to the outer limits
of the Continental Shelf. The controversy culminated in October
1945 when the Attorney General of the United States filed suit
against California claiming the title of the United States to the
lands under the sea out to three miles from the shores. The Supreme Court did not expressly hold that the United States owned
the submerged lands, but held that the national government's
interest in defense, international affairs, and commerce gave the
United States a paramount control over those lands which made
it unlawful for the states to lease or exploit these lands. The
Court did not expressly withdraw from its earlier holding that
the tidelands are state property.5 0 Admittedly the ownership of'
the states to the land between high and low tides is more firmly
implaced in history and in law than is the ownership of lands
by the states out to the three mile limit.
The government denied that the original states, either as
colonies or states ever had any ownership in the marginal seas,
alleging that such ownership came wholly as the result of the
assertion of national authority by the federal government in its
international relations. 5 1 The theory or at least the behavior of
the federal government in response to the proposition that it held
tidelands and lands out to the three mile limit for the benefit of
future states was nullified by the California decision. Custom
and usage here did not have the force of law. Texas, as an indeSan Francisco Savings Union v. R. G. P. Petroleum Co., 144 Cal. 134, 103
Am. St. Rep. 72, 1 Ann. Cas. 182, 77 Pa. 823, 66 L. R. A. 242 (1904).
"' By act of the legislature of California, passed March 25, 1909 (Pol. Code,
Sec. 3443a).
" San Francisco Savings Union v. R. G. P. Petroleum Co., supra.
"Robert E. Hardwicke, "The Tidelands and Oil". Atlantic, June 1949, pp.
21-22.
"See: Skirotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69, 61 S. Ct. 924, 85 L. Ed. 1193 (1941).
'0Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 56 S. Ct. 23, 80 L. Ed. 9 (1935).
"Tom C. Clark, "National Sovereignty and Dominion over Lands Underlying the Ocean", Texas Law Review, December 1948, pp. 153-157.
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pendent nation, had a three league boundary in the Gulf of Mexico.
The government alleged that when Texas was accepted as a state
she came into the Union on an equal footing 52 with the other
states and thus surrendered her former proprietorship in the
submerged gulf lands. This position was upheld by the Supreme
Court, holding that this is an instance where property interests
are so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to follow
sovereignty.
The -theory now is that low water mark is passed international domain is reached i3 and property rights must be so subordinated to political rights as in substance to coalesce and unite
in the national sovereign. Such a theory destroys the concept of
the three mile belt of water as the territorial limits of the nation.
International domain is not reached within the three mile belt of
waters, but is reached beyond this limit. The President, by proclamation, has extended de facto the limits of territorial waters to
the edge of the Continental Shelf, declaring that subsoil and sea
bed beneath the high seas appertain to the United States and are
subject to its jurisdiction and control. It is inconceivable to assert
jurisdiction and control of the bed of the sea of the Continental
Shelf without the assertion of some measure of dominion and
control over the waters above the submerged lands.
The framers of the Constitution regarded the states as sovereign and independent. Everything possible was done to give
recognition to that knowledge, by the fear that if the Constitution
was ratified by the legislatures of these sovereign and independent
.states, it would be a mere treaty and not a constitution. Therefore ratification was proposed and secured at state conventions
composed of delegates elected by the people. All powers not expressly delegated to the5 4 federal government were reserved to the
states, or to the people.
PRIVATE RIGHTS

Private rights of the shore owner include the right to wharf
out to the point of practical navigability subject, of course, to
federal and state laws enacted to aid or protect commerce and
navigation. The states appear to have the power to convey to
the owner of the wharf a fee to the land under it,- 5 despite the
fact that the wharf extends beyond low tide mark. In absence of
conveyance, the wharf owner merely has an easement over state
land where construction of the wharf is a matter of right. The
wharf owner has merely a license when the construction is in
pursuance of a statute.
52"Equality of states that they are not less or greater, or different in dignity and power." United States v. State of Texas, supra.
I Such a theory is in accord with Regina v. Keyn, supra, but has not until
the recent decision of the Supreme Court been accepted in the United States.
The Court impliedly reversed Justice Story who held that waters within the

three mile belt form part of the nation's territory.
" U. S. Constitution, Article X.
Patton on Titles, Sec. 168.
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Title to land, by reclamation of submerged lands, was recognized as a common law right, but today such rights are usually
covered by statute. Upon completion of reclamation of the submerged lands, these new lands become a part of the owner's adjoining land and title is invested in the owner of the adjoining
land. Title gained in this manner will not be lost by subsequent
submergence of the land.56
At common law, where tidewater is made a boundary of land
it is presumed that the high water mark was intended as the
boundary line. 57 At common law where the description in a grant
or conveyance of land simply designates tidewater as the boundary, without further indicating the location of the boundary line
in relation to the water, it is presumed that the high water mark
was intended as the boundary line, and if the intent is to include
land under the water within the boundary, other words clearly
indicating such purpose must be employed.58 Where such a body
of water is designated as a boundary, the body of water proper,
and not the shore line of a harbor or bay opening into it, is the
boundary.59
CONCLUSIONS AND CONTINUING PROBLEMS

As the continents become more exploited, man has turned
increasingly to the sea for resources whenever technologically
possible.6 0 The oceans, covering two-thirds of the surface area of
the world, are international domain beyond the three mile limit.
The three mile limit is unrealistic in modern times, in that when
that limit was adopted three miles was the extreme range of
cannon. With modern weapons, a powerful nation could control
millions of square miles of ocean. International considerations
demand restraint in asserting national claims beyond the three
mile limit. If one nation asserts claims, other nations will assert
claims and eventually frontiers would be drawn hundreds if not
thousands of miles beyond the three mile limit. Such a situation
would be catastrophic as the trend of civilization must be away
from nationalism if world tensions are to be lessened. For this
reason, claims of Texas and Louisiana beyond the three mile limit
must be examined in the international perspective. The claims
of the federal government out to 150 miles or more to the edge
of the Continental Shelf also must be examined in the international
perspective. If the United States asserts such control other nations will assert control in the same measure. The asserting of
'Patton on Titles, Sec. 169.
C. J. S. 11, See. 27.
Shively v. Bowlby, supra.
"Tiffany v. Oyster Bay, supra.
I A striking example of mining activity under the bed of the sea is the
hematite mines off the north shore of Bell Island, Newfoundland, which extend
two miles slant distance from the shore and 1,200 feet under the bottom of
the bay. Wabona Mines of the Dominion Steel and Coal Corp. Ltd. produce
about 5,300 gross tons per day from three sloping submarine ore beds. "Newfoundland, Canada's New Province," Brown, Andrew H., Sisson, Robert F., The
National Geographic Mazagine, June 1949, p. 788.
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jurisdiction and control of the bed of the sea without the assertion
of dominion and control over the surface of the sea contiguous
with the edge of the continental shelves present a nice problem
of concurrent use, which will not be solved by mere policy assertions. For the practical reason that no other nation has the power
or industrial capacity to develop oil resources in the continental
shelves bordering the United States, perhaps this issue of international law is a moot question.
Questions concerning jurisdiction of states as to crimes in
airspace over the territorial waters of the United States were
clouded by the recent decisions affecting the tidelands.6 1 The
federal government was given jurisdiction July 12, 1952, over
acts of violence on American aircraft flying over the high seas
or within the maritime limits of the country. A bill for this purpose was signed by the President. This legislation was necessary
because a New York Federal Court held that62aircraft were excluded
from existing laws covering such offenses.
The national government claims land under the sea beyond
low water mark. Under present theory, if the sea retreated from
the land, the coastal states would hold title to land between high
and low tide. The private littoral owner would have his land
extended seaward to the high water mark. The federal government's interests would be lessened by the amount of land left dry
above the low tide mark where the land had been once submerged.
If the seas invaded the lands would property rights be subordinated as to follow sovereignty? 63 The sea is impliedly an agent
of sovereignty. As to whether such agency can destroy title, there
can be reasonable doubt. The court has said that the states never
had title to the three mile belt. The court's statement that international domain is reached at low tide mark is obviously defective
both from a physical sense and from an international sense. The
territorial waters of the United States extend three miles from
shore. International waters are beyond the three mile limit.
Before the assertion by the national government, state ownership had generally been assumed, but no square ruling of the
Supreme Court has determined the ownership of the lands under
the marginal sea. The tone of decisions dealing with similar problems indicate state ownership had been assumed. 64 The states
were thought to have dominion while the national government
61"Crimes Aboard American Aircraft; Under What Jurisdiction are They
Punishable," Cooper, John C., American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 37, No.
4, April 1951.

'United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298. Decided March 17, 1950.
"3The union and exercise of all human power possessed in a state: it is
a combination of all power; it is the power to do everything in a state without
accountability, to make laws, to execute and apply them, to impose and collect
taxes and levy contributions, to make war or peace, to form treaties of alliance
or of commerce with foreign nations and the like. Story, Const. Sec. 207.
" Pollard v. Hogan, 3 How. 212, 11 L. ed. 565; State of Louisiana v. State
of Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 52, 26 S. Ct. 408, 422, 50 L. ed. 913. The Abby Dodge,

223 U. S. 166, 32 S. Ct. 310, 56 L. ed. 390. State of New Jersey v. State of Delaware, 291 U. S. 361, 54 S. Ct. 407, 78 L. ed. 847.
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had imperium over the submerged lands. Dominion relates to
property rights and not political rights. Imperium relates to
political sovereignty. As the Supreme Court has not definitely
decided who "owns" the bed of the Continental Shelf, it is difficult to perceive how Congress can "give" the bed of the marginal
sea to the states. Congress has the power to dispose of the property of the United States, but no property rights have been expressly declared upon by the court. To resolve the problem upon
equitable consideration Congress should assert that the lands
within the traditional three mile limit are under the jurisdiction
of the states, except for Texas and Florida where the limit should
be the traditional three leagues from shore. The dominion of
these lands beyond these limits should be declared in the national
government. The political sovereignty of the national government
modified by international obligations should be declared to extend
over the surface of these waters to the edge of the Continental
Shelf. The court has not expressly withdrawn from its earlier
holding that the tidelands, the lands between high and low tide,
are state property.6 ,
Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 56 S. Ct. 23, 80 L. ed. 9 (1935).

ABOUT TIME
Inspired by a letter in the American Bar Association Journal,
Mr. Arthur Kramer of the New York Bar contributed the following to The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York which we herewith print with permission and with
full knowledge that this issue of Dicta will be distributed on the
eve of the Annual Picnic of the Denver Bar.
"Opposes Intoxicants at
Bar Meetings-"
Caption in the A.B.A. Journal

Little know the laity
Of their lawyers' gaietyHow, beneath the gravity,
Portliness and suavity,
Pullulates depravity.
0, their inebriety
In their own society!
0, with what rapidity
Founders their solidity!
0, the ribald raillery
Marking their cocktailery!
0, the rakish revelry,
0, the tipsy devilryTearing up the napery,
Tearing down the drapery,
Rivaling in japery
Voyagers to Gay Paree.
And let's not merely jaw about itThere ought to be a law about it.
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ACTION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
LAWRENCE A. LONG
of the Denver Bar

Of interest to every lawyer in Colorado should be the recent
decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of The People
of the State of Colorado, ex rel Duke W. Dunbarv. N. Mark Hanna'
because it should again focus attention to the important role that
the Bar has in serving the public interest and in the defense of
the legal profession. It should also serve as further warning and
deterent to those who continue to usurp the lawyer's field. The
Hanna case is the third such case successfully prosecuted within
the past 14 months. (People of State of Colorado, ex rel Attorney
General v. Wm.G. Newer, 125 Colo. 304, 242 P. 2d 615, Mar. 24,
1952; People of State of Colorado, ex rel Attorney General v.
Lloyd L. Brown, .....
Colo - ----, Aug. 18, 1952.)
The past few
years have seen an increased interest by the lawyers of the State
in taking affirmative action in this field.. Of further interest to
the members of our Bar is the nationwide attention afforded the
successful prosecution in the case of People of State of Colorado,
ex rel Attorney General v. D. W. Schmitt, Individually, and D. W.
Schmitt, Manager, doing business under the name and style of
"National Pure Trust Service, Rocky Mountain Division," 251 P.
2d 915, Dec. 15, 1952. Quoting from the March 1953 issue of the
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS, the publication of the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, it says of that case: "Since
this case is one of the most unusual and interesting cases ever presented in the history of litigation involving unauthorized practice
of the law, we take the liberty of setting forth in full the opinion
of the Court by Mr. Justice Alter."
The clear-cut mandates from the Court make it obvious that
our Colorado Supreme Court does not intend to allow the public
interest to be endangered by those who would assume to do that
for which they are neither qualified nor licensed. The splendid
cooperation received from the Attorney General's office is further
evidence that the State is doing its part for the protection of the
public.
Local lawyers are cognizant, both mentally and financially,
of unauthorized practices in their area. Until recently, not many
of them have seen fit to do much about it but the progress now
being made their interest is becoming more and more vocal. Heretofore, we have all stated that there was certainly a need for effort
but very little was done. The foregoing enumerated cases indicate only in part that now we are at least doing something about
it and that we are obtaining good results.
Many of us have too often regarded our Bar Associations as
honorary social groups when, in fact, we are the official representative of our profession. Many have asked, "What does the
I Colo. Bar Assn. Advance Sheet for May 30, 1953, Volume 5, No. 22, page
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Bar Association actually do for me?" There are many answers
to that question and one of them, as illustrated by these suits, is
definitive. Your Bar Associations, through the Unauthorized Practice Committees of each, are constantly hammering away at the
many forms of intrusion into our profession. We have had numerous complaints against those who, because of their quasi-connection
with legal matters, assume to operate in our field. In some instances, those who have not the remotest connection, affiliation,
reason or justification tender their services and all too often have
them accepted.
A few years ago, the Unauthorized Practice Committee of
the Colorado Bar Association received fewer complaints than it
does now. Some may take this to mean that there are more violations. On the contrary, it is just the reverse. The answer lies in
the fact that the lawyers in this State, and elsewhere, have now
been aroused to the point where they will take action. Certainly
a more gratifying condition could not exist unless it would be
that of having every lawyer feel that, as an officer of the Court
and in the interest of the general public, he should "stand up and
be counted" when he came face to face with practices which he
knew were violations.
Individual Bar Associations have shown that they have the
guts to fight for the public interest and the protection of lawyers'
rights. Coordinated effort by all of them now presents a united
front. It is the feeling of this writer that the foregoing spirit has
found its way into the Supreme Court to the extent that it looks
with favor on any profession that thinks enough of itself to protect the public interest and their own rights.
Some years ago, the public might have greeted the "public
interest" theory with cynicism. But with the progress made, the
attendant publicity, and the good faith continuously evidenced,
they are now convinced of our earnestness and of the fact that it
-really is in their interest, as well as in the interest of the lawyer
jealously guarding his profession.
Time, new and accelerated business methods, revised Court
rules, decisions, etc., have over and again cut into the legal profession. In every instance our profession has come forward with
a solution that has not only overcome the problem, but in the last
analysis, redounded to our benefit.
Nothing is intended in the foregoing article to be either
chesty or unduly optimistic. It is simply to call the attention of
the Bar in general, to the fact that, under their stimulus, progress
has been made and our position improved. Our progress does not
mean that our efforts must stop. Quite to the contrary-success
begets more success. The work of the Bar Association is not now
ended. It must go on and, with increased interest and effort, it
will continue to succeed. Our advantages thus far are small compared with what the future could hold in store for us. The cooperation of the entire Bar is the answer and each member must do
his part.
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VISITING PROFESSOR TO TEACH ESTATE PLANNING
During the 1953 Summer Session of the School of Law at the
University of Colorado, William J. Bowe, Professor of Law from
Vanderbilt University, a leading expert in his field, will conduct
courses in Estate Planning and Drafting Wills and Trusts.
The class in Estate Planning will meet at 7:30 A.M. on Tuesdays and Thursdays and at 1:30 P.M. on Wednesdays and the class
in Drafting at 11:00 A.M. on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
First classes will be held on Wednesday, June 17th.
Attorneys interested in attending either or both classes may
obtain auditor's cards for the ten weeks at a total cost of $25.00.
Admission to persons other than law students will be limited
to the first twenty-five persons who, by letter or telephone call to
the Dean's Office at the Law School, signify their intention to
attend these classes.

SAFETY DEPOSIT BOXES
The Denver Vault Association, composed of the various Safe
Deposit Departments in Metropolitan Denver, has for some time
been trying to reach a uniform practice in regard to releasing
insurance policies upon the death of a box renter. The Association
announces that an insurance policy payable to a named beneficiary
will henceforth be released at the time of the inventory by the
State Inheritance Department, if the beneficiary is present.

THE MERCHANTS FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
of Denver, Colorado
G. N. GARDNER, President

GARDNER AGENCY, INC., Denver Agents
640 Gas & Electric Bldg.

DENVER, COLO.

CHerry 5546

Brainerd, Montgomery and Sanborn Insurors, Inc.
COMPLETE INSURANCE
BONDING SERVICE ........

AND

WILLIAM D. SANBORN, President
University Bldg.

University Bldg.

DENVER, COLORADO
DENVER, COLORADO
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